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AFIT/GCE/ENG/05-07 
Abstract 
Secure electronic communication is based on secrecy, authentication and 
authorization.  One means of assuring a communication has these properties is to use 
Public Key Cryptography (PKC).  The framework consisting of standards, protocols and 
instructions that make PKC usable in communication applications is called a Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI).  This thesis aims at proving the applicability of the Simple Public 
Key Infrastructure (SPKI) as a means of PKC. 
The strand space approach of Guttman and Thayer is used to provide an 
appropriate model for analysis.  A Diffie-Hellman strand space model is combined with 
mixed strand space proof methods for proving the correctness of multiple protocols 
operating in the same context.  The result is the public key mixed strand space model.  
This model is ideal for the analysis of SPKI applications operating as sub-protocols of an 
implementing application. 
This thesis then models the popular Internet Transport Layer Security (TLS) 
protocol as a public key mixed strand space model.  The model includes the integration of 
SPKI certificates.  To accommodate the functionality of SPKI, a new protocol is designed 
for certificate validation, the Certificate Chain Validation Protocol (CCV).  The CCV 
protocol operates as a sub-protocol to TLS and provides online certificate validation. 
The security of the TLS protocol integrated with SPKI certificates and sub-
protocols is then analyzed to prove its security properties.  The results show that the 
modified TLS protocol exhibits the same security guarantees in isolation as it does when 
executing its own sub-protocols and the SPKI Certificate Chain Validation protocol.
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SIMPLE PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE PROTOCOL ANALYSIS AND DESIGN 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Diffie and Hellman provided the foundation of public key cryptography in the 
1970s in (1) and it has been used in electronic communications ever since.  However, as 
often as it has been used successfully, poor implementations have resulted in its 
exploitation.  It has become increasingly clear that the strength of a cryptographic system 
rests not only on the mathematics of cryptography but also on the protocols and 
implementation methods used in application design. 
This work focuses on the cryptographic framework provided by the Simple Public 
Key Infrastructure (SPKI).  This highly customizable and flexible standard implements a 
robust public key infrastructure aimed at overcoming the shortcomings of current X.509-
based architectures.  Integrating SPKI into an existing application or building a new one 
must be done with diligence.  Despite its strong cryptography, SPKI is just as vulnerable 
to the shortcomings of poor protocol design as any security framework. 
This thesis demonstrates the use of strand space, the formal protocol analysis 
method developed by Thayer, et al (2).  The strand space formalism is used as a means of 
integrating SPKI into the Transport Layer Security Protocol (TLS).  The security 
properties of TLS are proven and a new protocol, to accommodate the validation of SPKI 
certificates, is designed.  These results provide the solution to gaps in previous SPKI 
secure web implementations, which assumed execution in a secure environment (27; 12).  
Furthermore, the method used here encourages up front consideration to security protocol 
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design by incorporating analysis into the development process.  As pointed out by Arkin, 
Stender and McGraw in their article on software penetration testing (3:84-87), too often 
security matters are taken into consideration late in the design process.  However, if care 
is taken when developing a protocol, strand space proofs can be direct implications from 
the design. 
Chapter 2 identifies the context of cryptography this project focuses on, the 
motivation for SPKI development and the basic foundation of the strand space formalism.  
Chapter 3 identifies how strand space was tailored to accommodate SPKI analysis and 
how it is intended to prove properties about multiple protocols operating in the same 
environment.  Chapter 4 provides theorems and their proofs based on TLS security 
properties and the execution of sub-protocols within the context of TLS.  Additionally, 
Chapter 4 contains the design of the new Certificate Validation protocol.  The final 
chapter provides a summary of the analysis, future work and conclusions. 
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II. Public Key Cryptography and Protocol Analysis 
2.1 Security & Cryptography 
The National Research Council (NRC) reveals in (4: Part I) just how critical 
security in electronic communication is to individuals, companies and the government as 
a whole.  The essence of this security is to prevent the interception, disruption and 
alteration of a communication between two or more principals. A modern day solution to 
these problems is Public Key Cryptography (PKC).  Developed in the seminal paper by 
Whitefield Diffie and Martin Hellman (1), PKC offers solutions for secrecy, 
authentication and non-repudiation, among other desired security goals of the NRC 
proposal. 
As PKC has developed, it has become common practice to use the Alice-Bob 
scenario as meaningful, albeit informal means of discussing protocol interactions and the 
security desires of principals executing a protocol.  The nomenclature is introduced here 
as it will be used throughout the analysis and is found throughout cryptography literature.  
The scenario posits two principals, Alice and Bob, denoted in short hand as A and B.  
Alice wishes to communicate some message to Bob.  Depending on the sensitivity of the 
information, Alice may want to authenticate Bob (or vice versa), ensure secrecy of the 
communication or have Bob prove to her that he is authorized to receive the message. 
The goal of a security protocol is generally to provide some combination of 
secrecy, authentication or authorization.  To begin, secrecy is the most basic of security 
properties.  A secret communication is intended to be impossible for a third principal, 
3 
 
referred to as a penetrator, to decipher.  Consequently a protocol that is secret is assumed 
to be impervious to eavesdropping. 
Authentication, on the other hand, provides Alice with some degree of certainty 
that she is in fact speaking with Bob.  A ‘man in the middle’ attack such as the one 
discussed in (5:8-10), would allow a penetrator to trick Alice into thinking she is talking 
with Bob when in fact she is communicating with the penetrator.  A message that can be 
guaranteed through some cryptographic means to come from a particular party is said to 
be authentic.  A stronger version of authentication is non-repudiation.  A non-reputable 
message is provably sent and received from the appropriate principals. 
Beyond authentication and secrecy, is authorization.  Perhaps Bob authenticates 
Alice, and they communicate securely, however Bob wants to know weather or not Alice 
should be allowed to know what he is about to tell her.  If he can determine Alice has 
permission to receive the information, she is said to be authorized. 
Public Key Cryptography offers a flexible solution to authentication and secrecy.  
Each principal obtains a key-pair consisting of a public and a private key.  Although the 
keys are different, they exhibit mathematical properties such that a message encrypted 
with one can only be decrypted by the other.  The mathematics driving this functionality 
is rooted in number theory and expressed thoroughly in (6:175-178, 275-280). 
In PKC, each principal keeps one key secret and publishes the other to be publicly 
available to other principals.  In a public key environment, if Alice wishes to 
communicate to Bob secretly, she encrypts her message with Bob’s public key.  If Bob’s 
private key is uncompromised, he is the only one that can decrypt and read Alice’s 
message. 
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PKC also provides the ability to sign messages.  Signing is the converse of an 
encryption.  A principal signs a message by using its private key to encrypt it.  Due to the 
property of the PKC key pair, everyone with access to the public key can then decipher 
and read the message.  However, if Alice signs a message with an uncompromised key 
and supplies it to Bob, then Bob can be positive that Alice is the only one that could have 
created that message.  Of course in this situation the communication, although 
authentically from Alice, provides no secrecy, as all principals that can hear the message 
can use Alice’s public key to decrypt it.  To provide secrecy to this interaction, the signed 
message would need to be encrypted with a private or secret key. 
Signatures enable the use of certificates.  A certificate is a message signed by a 
principal and is a guarantee from that principal.  Often times trusted principals are an 
authority of some type.  For example a name authority provides certificates that assert 
guarantees of a principal’s identity.  A certificate issued by a certificate authority (CA) is 
assumed to be true based on the trust of that CA.  A certificate can be applied to 
ownership of a resource, an identity or some other type of electronic relationship.  For 
example, take a scenario such that both Alice and Bob trust a third principal, Cyril.  In 
this instance, Cyril provides certificates to Alice and Bob.  Alice’s certificate contains her 
public key and the same is true for Bob’s certificate.  When Alice sends a message signed 
with her private key, Bob can decrypts it with her public key provided by Cyril’s 
certificate.  If Bob needs additional proof, he can ask Cyril to verify the authenticity of 
the certificate used by Alice.  In either case, Bob now knows or assumes that Alice is not 
only who she says she is, but also she is who the CA, Cyril, claims her to be.  This 
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scenario is simplistic, but it illustrates that a certificate provides a guarantee based on the 
level of trust for the CA. 
2.2 Public Key Infrastructure 
A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is the combination of standards, procedures and 
protocols used to issue and revoke keys or authenticate keys that are in used in public key 
cryptography (7).  The design of this infrastructure is just as important as the 
cryptography itself.  If there is a flaw in any part of the infrastructure, then the integrity 
of the system as a whole is jeopardized. 
For clarity, it is convenient to define common cryptographic terms.  A key is 
assumed to be either the public or private part of a key pair used in PKC.  In general the 
only keys PKC protocols openly use are the public keys, whereas private keys are stored 
safely and only used their owners.  Symmetric keys will be scarcely used; however, when 
they are used they are identified with qualified names such as a session keys or long-term 
keys.  These are assumed to be generated in a secure manner or stored in a way that 
prohibits their exposure. 
Certificates, issued by Certificate Authorities, provide a guarantee about their 
owner.  Most commonly certificates provide guarantees about authorization, group 
membership or identities.  Regardless of what a certificate is issued to certify, all 
certificates are a binding between a principal’s public key and the information 
representing the certificate type. 
A principal is a user of the system.  Principals are one of two types, regular or 
penetrator.  A regular principal follows the protocols and standards of the PKI and 
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operates within system parameters.  A penetrator is a malicious principal that drives to 
undermine the security provided by the PKI. 
A protocol is the functional description of principal interaction.  A protocol 
defines what information is sent, what format it is in and when to send it.  Generally, 
protocols are built with one or more security goals in mind.  Thus, the execution of a safe 
protocol will provide some combination of authentication, secrecy or authorization.  
However, a protocol that attempts too much can lead to a cumbersome implementation.  
If an infrastructure based on this is considered too burdensome to use, it is as useless as 
not having a secure infrastructure at all (8). 
2.2.1 X.509. 
X.509 is the de facto standard for Internet PKI.  X.509 establishes the framework 
for a centrally controlled directory of cryptographic keys and users.  The directory is 
managed by Certificate Authorities, which carry out the procedures for supplying and 
validating certificates.  A corresponding authority in the structure is the Naming 
Authority (NA).  The NA controls the scheme with which a CA issues certificates to a 
particular name.  Often times it is convenient for NAs and CAs to be the same entity, 
however, this can preclude independent CAs from sharing a single NA, which degrades 
the continuity of the global directory X.509 relies upon (9). 
X.509 certificates bind a public key to a name of a principal with a global 
directory of names.  This type of certificate is called a name certificate.  X.509 relies on a 
unique name for each user participating in the PKI.  This empowers the infrastructure to 
issue certificates and provide definitive guarantees as to the registered identity of 
individuals.  When a certificate is under question, all one needs to do is refer to the global 
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directory and all the necessary information is provided concerning that certificate and the 
individual it was issued to. 
In practice, X.509 has revealed a number of shortcomings.  Privacy is an 
important issue in cryptography; however, the existence of a global hierarchy inherently 
lacks privacy.  For example, a company that requires its employees to have some degree 
of anonymity may want them to utilize PKC via the X.509 hierarchy.  In doing so they 
would identify themselves as an employee of that company.  However, to protect against 
this type of information leak, the company may choose not to register a portion of its 
employees in the global directory.  Although this protects that group’s privacy, it 
diminishes the inherent strength of the directory by decreasing the number of 
participants. 
X.509 authentications rely on having on individuals registered to unique names.  
This restricts usable names and also presents a considerable challenge to issue unique 
certificates.  Due to the global scope of the directory, it is a sizeable configuration 
challenge to coordinate non-repeating names for all users. 
Currently in draft form, the X.509 standard overall is a fairly complicated and 
cumbersome standard.  As a result, it has been subject to wide interpretation.  There are 
no guarantees between different implementations that certificates will be formed in the 
same manner, be processed in the same way, or even be accepted by all applications 
using them. 
This overview is only meant to reveal some of the clear problems with the X.509 
standard and justify why others are motivated to propose new standards.  ` more thorough 
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review of X.509 and public key infrastructures is available in (10: 3-9), and the technical 
reader is directed to the standard itself (9).  
Carl Ellison, et al (8), in light of X.509 shortcomings, has proposed an alternative 
infrastructure to support public key cryptography.  They aimed at creating a PKI that is 
extensible, robust and easy to use.  This new PKI is aptly named the Simple Public Key 
infrastructure (SPKI). 
2.2.2 SPKI/SDSI. 
In short, SPKI is just as its name suggests, a simple PKI.  It was developed 
concurrently with the Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure (SDSI), a standard for 
defining certificates.  Based on the same principles, these two standards eventually 
merged to form SPKI/SDSI.  For brevity, the pair is most commonly referred to as simply 
SPKI. 
Traditionally, certificates have been a binding between a name and a key.  
However, Ellison, et al, point out in (11:7-8) that a key holder’s name is rarely of security 
interest.  Rather, it is argued, the authorizations of that person are inherently more useful.  
Thus, in addition to name certificates, SPKI uses authorization certificates.  This novel 
concept allows an authority to associate an authorization directly to a principal.  The 
certificate thus is a binding of an authorization to a key and offers an explicit and 
customizable assurance of authorization. 
Authorization certificates enable a CA to provide anonymity and privacy to the 
users of the PKI.  If the identity of the principal is not contested but rather only a user’s 
authorization to perform an action, a user’s identity can remain private.  One application 
of this is secret balloting.  If keys are bound with no identifying information and 
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distributed blindly, then participants may use them to vote without revealing their 
identity.  This is made possible by using separate certificates for identity and 
authorization.  Where traditional certificates merge identity and authorization, SPKI 
breaks these into two types of certificates, which offers the flexibility for unique 
situations such as anonymous voting or group authorizations. 
SPKI governs authorization through customizable authorization tags.  There are 
very few limitations to these tags in order for them to be easily applied in a diverse range 
of applications.  This flexibility, however, comes with a price.  The issuers of the 
certificates must have intimate knowledge of the authorization requirements of the 
system.  This problem is compounded by the distribution of certificates via delegation. 
In the SPKI framework, each principal is empowered with the ability to issue 
certificates.  In short, each principal is a certificate authority for any resource it controls.  
If a resource requires secrecy, authentication and authorization, then certificates granting 
access to that resource reflect that all three security properties must be fulfilled to validate 
access. 
Intuitively, each principal is the keeper of his or her own resources.  Therefore 
must manage them and provide certificates that will make sense when supplying access 
to those resources.  Since certificates are issued by all principals, there is no need to 
coordinate with other principals to ensure unique names.  Just like the authorization 
certificates, each principal has its own frame of reference concerning principals it will 
work with.  Each principal’s perspective is referred to as a namespace.  A namespace 
represents the domain of that principal.  A principal that controls a university will have a 
large namespace, while a student within that university may have a very limited one. 
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The management of a large namespace is simplified by the ability to delegate 
authority through SPKI certificates.  Using the university example again, the principal in 
charge of a university can delegate university authority to its various departments, and in 
turn the departments can delegate it down to their own divisions.  Ultimately, a student in 
the delegation chain may be issued a certificate that identifies him or her as a student of 
the university in the computer science department in the graduate school. 
An authorization certificate has a delegation bit to manage the user of delegation.  
If the delegation bit is enabled, then the principal issued that authorization can delegate it 
to principals in its own namespace.  In the university example, the university initially 
supplies an authorization with the delegation bit enabled.  In turn each level of the 
hierarchy re-issues the authorization with the enabled bit.  Finally, the student receives a 
certificate with a disabled delegation bit.  Thus, although the student is authorized to 
access student resources, that student does not have the ability to delegate that 
authorization to anyone else.  In this way, a local hierarchy is built with the delegation of 
authority beginning at the university level and ultimately ending with a student who no 
longer has the ability to delegate. 
Once delegation has taken place and meaningful keys are distributed, there still 
remains the challenge of proving a certificate was issued from the proper chain of 
authority.  This process is called certificate chain discovery.  In essence it follows a 
transitive property.  For example, imagine three principals A, B, and C.  A is the owner of 
a resource, and grants authority to B to delegate access to that resource.  B delegates 
authorization to C to use the resource.  In turn, C asks to use the resource, and is 
challenged by A.  In response to the challenge, C provides a certificate chain that shows 
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the delegation from A B C.  A reduces the certificate chain to a simple form A C, 
and is convinced that C should be authorized to access the resource. 
Due to the potential problem of determining the appropriate chain to supply given 
a challenge, a good deal of research has been conducted on this topic (12;13;14) and has 
resulted in a tractable and efficient algorithm for certificate chain discovery. 
2.3 Protocol Analysis 
Modern protocol proof methods are generally founded on two seminal papers 
with regards to abstraction and focus.  The Dolev-Yao model, proposed originally in 
1981 (15), abstracts protocol messages into a term algebra.  In applied cryptography 
messages are bit-strings, however, abstracting them into terms allows the focus of the 
analysis to be on the protocol itself.  These terms are then applied to a first order 
equational logic, which allows them to be manipulated as they would in a cryptographic 
protocol. 
Because attacks on cryptographic systems generally avoid challenging the 
mathematics cryptography is built upon (6), but rather exploit protocol design, it is 
possible for poor protocols to undermine the very security they intend to provide.  (16) 
provides numerous examples of security protocols that are now defunct or have 
undergone numerous fixes to prevent simple intrusions.  Many protocol attacks are a 
result of incomplete, misguided or misinterpreted proofs of protocol correctness. 
Along this vein, Woo and Lam argue that the problem with protocol analysis is 
that it fails to separate correctness and verification.  Instead, it includes too much in a 
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single analysis, without considering the importance of individual parts.  This focus, they 
argue, only contributes to complicated proofs that are often misunderstood. 
Consequently, Woo and Lam break down analysis into two elements, secrecy and 
correspondence.  Secrecy is the notion of maintaining data integrity in the presence of a 
penetrator.  Integrity includes a secret message remaining secret and unaltered from when 
it was sent.  Correspondence, on the other hand, is what has been referred to thus far as 
authentication.  By dividing these two notions it is possible to obtain flexible analysis for 
a diverse range of protocols. 
Based upon Dolev-Yao and supported by the Woo-Lam notion of separation of 
secrecy and authentication, Thayer, et al, developed the strand space formalism for 
protocol analysis (2). 
2.3.1 Strand Space. 
The strand space formalism establishes an inductive base used to prove theorems 
about protocol correctness.  This section provides the basic definitions of strand space, 
although a more thorough description is available in the defining papers (2; 17; 18; 21; 
28; 29). 
The strand space formalism imposes a Dolev-Yao style set theory on protocol 
messages.  All data used and communicated by a protocol is a member in the set A.  This 
set is then specialized into disjoint sets for more accurate models of data.  In particular, A 
contains the subsets of keys K and texts T.  The language of strand space is then built 
freely from these sets using operators appropriate to the protocol being analyzed (2). 
The encryption operator takes any term g from A, a key k from K, and outputs an 
encryption {g}k that is in A, but not in either K or T.  The join operator simply takes two 
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terms, g and h, concatenates them and results in a new term in A.  These sets allow a 
proof to reason about which sets of information are available to each principal and 
penetrator of a protocol.  As protocols become more specialized, these operators can be 
expanded, such as in (17). 
Furthermore, a sub-term relationship  is defined over terms.  The result of the 
join operator is a term which contains the two sub-terms used to create it.  On the other 
hand, the sub-term of an encryption is only the payload of the cipher text and not the key 
used to create it.  Formally, the sub-term relationship  is the smallest inductive relation 
such that it has the properties of Table 1 (23:11-23). 
Table 1 Sub-term relationships of terms 
Relationship Elucidation 
t  t t is a sub-term of itself 
t  {g}k if t  g t is a sub-term of an encryption only if it is 
a sub-term of the payload of that 
encryption. 
t  gh if t  g OR t  h t is a sub-term of a concatenation if it is a 
sub-term of either of the terms composing 
the concatenation. 
 
The strand space formalism models a protocol into a set of nodes and edges.  Each 
principal of a protocol is modeled by a subset of these nodes and edges forming a graph 
structure called a strand.  A strand consists of a series of temporally ordered nodes 
connected by intra-strand edges  representing a series of actions.  These actions will 
always be appropriate for the type of strand they are on and can include the deciphering 
of an encryption, the concatenation of terms or the separation of terms.  Each node of a 
strand is associated exclusively with the reception or the transmission of a message from 
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that node’s strand to or from another strand.  Inter-strand communication is represented 
by inter-strand edges .  An inter-strand edge always includes a term from the set A 
representing information communicated to or from that node. 
A principal is represented by one or more strands.  Several strands linked together 
constitute a strand space representing all possible communications between connected 
strands.  Subsets of this graph, called bundles, are more manageable and are used to 
accurately and minimally represent protocol principal interactions.  Appendix A provides 
a simple example of a protocol and its strand space representation. 
These and other formal definitions constitute the foundation of the strand space 
formalism (2: 6-15): 
 
A strand space Σ is composed of the following: 
nodes – a tuple s,i , where s is a strand, Σ∈s  and i is an integer 1 ≤ i ≤ length of 
the strand.  The set of nodes is denoted .  The node s,i  belongs to the strand s 
and every node belongs to exactly one strand. 
 
terms – if n = s,i  ∈   then index(n) = I and strand(n) = s.  Then term(n) is the 
ith signed term in the trace of s.  That is the ith term communicated between this 
strand and another. 
 
inter-strand edges – an edge n1→ n2 if and only if term(n1) = +t and term(n2) = -t 
for some t ∈  A.  The sign of a term indicates weather it has been sent (positive) or 
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received (negative).  An inter-strand edge captures a causal relationship between 
strands. 
 
intra-strand edges – When n1 = s,i  and n2 = s,i+1  and n1, n2 ∈ , there is 
and edge n1  n2.  This type of edge expresses that n1 is an immediate causal 
predecessor of n2 on the strand s.  The set n′ is used to denote all predecessors of 
a node on a single strand. 
 
occurrences – a term t is said to occur on a node n if and only if t  term(n). 
 
entry points – the node  is an entry point for a set of terms I if and only if 
term(n) = +t for some t ∈I, and whenever term(n′)  I. 
 
originations – A term t originates on  if and only if n is an entry point for 
the set I ={t′: t  t′}. 
 
unique originations – a term t is uniquely originating if and only if t originates on 
a unique . 
 
bundles – a bundle  consists of a finite subset of nodes, inter-strand edges and 
intra-strand edges of a given strand space.  If the node n2 ∈  and term(n2) is 
negative then there is a unique n1 ∈   such that n1→n2.  Furthermore, if n1 n2 is 
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in Σ and n2∈  then n1 n2 is in .  Finally, this subset of Σ must be acyclic to be 
considered a bundle. 
 
It is worthwhile noting that the properties of a bundle allow a partial order relation 
to be defined.  Thus,  is the reflexive, anti-symmetric, transitive closure of the edges of 
a bundle.  This ordering ensures that every non-empty subset of nodes in a bundle has a 
minimal member with respect to .  Furthermore any term, t, of the minimal node of a 
bundle must have a positive sign, and is an originating occurrence of t. 
Strand space was developed to prove properties not only about protocols in an 
isolated environment, but also can represent multi-protocols in a single strand space.  A 
strand space representing a primary protocol and any number of sub-protocols is called a 
mixed strand space.  A protocol used in the presence of sub-protocols is called a base 
protocol.  A base protocol can have any number of sub-protocols that may influence the 
security properties of the all the protocols it interacts with. 
In contrast to this hierarchy of sub-protocols, is the analysis hierarchy.  The 
subject of an analysis is called the primary protocol.  Any other protocol operating in the 
same strand space as a primary protocol is called a secondary protocol.  The primary 
protocol is used to produce the foundation of definitions, properties and rules with which 
to compare secondary protocols.  A base protocol may intuitively seem like the best 
choice for a primary protocol, however, this does not have to be the case. 
More formally, in a mixed strand space Σ, the set Σ1 is the set of all primary 
regular strands.  The remaining regular strands Σ2 are secondary strands and constitute 
the set difference of all primary strands and the set of regular strands.  Thus, the mixed 
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strand space Σ is composed of the disjoint sets of primary strands Σ1, secondary strands 
Σ2 and penetrator strands PΣ. 
The strand space model is further extended in (17) to provide a means for 
analyzing the Diffie-Hellman (DH) protocol.  A protocol is said to be conservative with 
regard to DH if a generated key arises on a regular node only when the values used to 
create it arise on regular nodes.  Furthermore, a protocol is said to be silent with respect 
to DH if no DH generated key originates on a regular node.  It is also convenient to 
conclude that a bundle over a protocol that is silent and conservative with respect to DH, 
and only has DH constructors that arise on regular strands will never originate a DH 
generated key. 
The strand space formalism allows the application of induction to prove the 
properties of bundles representing protocol interactions.  Various proofs that use this 
formalism are published in (2).  As strand space has developed it has expanded to include 
a proof method to more easily apply the formalism to protocol analysis: the 
authentication test. 
2.3.1.1 Authentication Tests 
The authentication test method for strand space analysis was established to 
expedite secrecy and authentication proofs (18).  Authentication tests do this by building 
on strand space theory and an assumption referred to as the normal form lemma.  The 
normal form lemma simply limits the actions of the penetrator to non-trivial 
manipulations of messages.  Among other things this means that if a term is encrypted 
with a key the penetrator does not have, then it cannot be deciphered.  It has been proven 
that enforcing this restriction on the penetrator only forces an ordering of actions, but 
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does not limit what can be accomplished by the penetrator.  The useful consequence of 
this is that if a term is sent encrypted with a safe key then it can only be altered by a 
regular participant.  Thus, if that term is returned altered, it can be assumed that a regular 
participant received it, altered it, and sent it back.  Such a term is what Thayer, et al, 
defines as a test component and the actions taken on it as an authentication test.  
Authentication tests rely on two additional assumptions, proven elsewhere (18), 
regarding keys used in cryptography.  First, messages sent with a key known by the 
penetrator can be manipulated by the penetrator.  In addition, keys that are sent encrypted 
with a key known by the penetrator then become a key known by the penetrator.  These 
are the only means the penetrator has of obtaining keys.  Conversely, a key is considered 
safe if it is either never uttered by a principal in the protocol or is only uttered as a sub-
term of a term encrypted with a key that is not known by the penetrator. 
In order to reason about messages sent between strands, it is necessary to deal 
with the atomic pieces of terms.  These are defined as components.  A term t0 is a 
component of a term t if it is a sub-term of t, if it is not a concatenated term, and no 
concatenated term in t is equal to t0  Less formally, components are either an atomic value 
or they are an encryption. 
A component is considered new at a node in a strand if it is a component of that 
node, but it is not a component of any previous node on that strand.  The fact that it may 
have been a sub-term of a larger component previously in the strand makes no difference.  
Since the component was not a visible component of previous terms, it is new at its first 
non-sub-term appearance.  Thus, it is an intuitive assumption that if a component occurs 
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new on a regular node, then the strand has either generated, encrypted or decrypted 
information to supply the new component. 
The authentication tests themselves revolve around the transformation of 
components.  An edge n1  n2 is a transformed edge for a term t, if n1 is positive and n2 
is negative, t is a sub-term of n1 and there is a new component t2 of n2 which contains t as 
a sub-term.  On the other hand an edge is a transforming edge if n1 is negative and n2 is 
positive, t is a sub-term of n1 and there is a new component of n2 which contains t as a 
sub-term.  Figure 1 shows visually a simple example of both types of edges. 
 
 
Figure 1 Strand space edges 
 
Components of interest in proofs are known as test components.  A component c, 
is a test component for a term t at a node if t is a sub-term of c and c is a component of 
that node, and the term c is not a proper sub-term of a component of any other node in the 
strand space.  Combining this with the previous edge definitions, an edge between two 
nodes (n1  n2) is a test for term t if t uniquely originates at node n1 and the edge 
between n1 and n2 is a transformed edge for t. 
A test component is used as a challenge to another participant in a protocol.  One 
way to offer this challenge is to take a uniquely originating value, such as a nonce, 
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encrypt it and send it to another principal.  At this point, the challenge is to see if the 
principal is able to decipher it, this is called an outgoing test.  If instead the value is sent 
in the clear and is expected to be returned in an encrypted form, the interaction is an 
incoming test.  Depending on the properties of the messages being sent, these two 
authentication tests can offer a variety of guarantees to one or both of the parties. 
Authentication tests provide guarantees about the existence of regular strands 
receiving sent messages.  If a bundle includes an outgoing test for a component then there 
exists a corresponding set of nodes from another regular strand that constitute a 
transforming edge for that component.  Additionally, if a component c only occurs as a 
sub-term of an encrypted term t of the regular strand including the transforming edge, and 
t is not a proper sub-term of any regular component, and the key used to encrypt it is not 
known by the penetrator, then there must be a negative regular node with t as a 
component. 
The corresponding assertions are also valid for incoming tests.  Given a bundle 
and a term t that is an incoming test for a within that bundle, then there exist regular 
nodes that t is a component of and there is an edge corresponding to those nodes that is a 
transforming edge for a. 
One final definition is required for a third authentication test, the unsolicited test.  
A negative node n is considered an unsolicited test for an encrypted term t, if t is a test 
component for any a in n and the encrypted key is not known by the penetrator.  Thus, 
given a bundle with a node n which receives an unsolicited test for an encrypted term t, 
then there must exist a positive regular node from another strand such that t is a 
component of that node. 
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These authentication tests are combined with the properties of the terms being 
sent in a protocol to prove authentication and secrecy guarantees.  Detailed examples are 
available in (18). 
2.3.1.2 Penetrator Strands 
Regular strands are those that represent a legitimate and accurate run of a 
protocol.  In a two-principal protocol, regular strands are generally called the initiator and 
responder strands.  Protocols that include a trusted server will also include a server 
strand.  This naming method of strands is not formal; however, it is employed to make 
reasoning about protocols more easily understood.  The other type of strand useful to 
protocol analysis is the penetrator strand. 
In strand space the penetrator is represented by eight types of penetrator strands.  
These strand types are separate in order to differentiate what a penetrator can and cannot 
do in an attempt to infiltrate a protocol.  Roughly speaking, the eight strands capture the 
penetrator’s ability to block messages, generate messages, join messages from parts of 
other messages, and apply encryption or decryption.  These effectively model what 
typical protocol attacks consist of and thus reveal these weaknesses during protocol 
analysis.  The eight strands are represented by a single letter, M, F, T, C, S, K, E, or D.  
Their definitions follow. 
 
M : Sending a message. 
F : Receiving a message. 
T :  Receiving a message and sending it out to two other strands. 
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C : Concatenation.  Receiving two different terms, and sending the concatenation 
of them to another strand. 
S : Separation.  Receiving a concatenation of terms, separating them, and sending 
each out individually. 
K : Key.  Sending a key as a term, all keys sent this way are assumed already 
known to the penetrator. 
E : Encryption.  Receive a key, and a term, and send out the term encrypted with 
the key. 
D : Decryption.  Receive in inverse key, and an encrypted term.  Decrypt the 
term, and send out the unencrypted term. 
 
Because the model of the penetrator is not protocol specific, it can be applied to 
any protocol under analysis.  More importantly, it can help determine what information 
the penetrator can learn or how the penetrator can trick other strands into believing they 
are talking with someone else. 
An infiltrated strand space is the union of regular and penetrator strands.  Bundles 
carved out of infiltrated strand spaces reveal the weakness or conversely the strengths of 
a protocol under attack.  Such an analysis is demonstrated in (2; 17; 18; 21; 28; 29). 
In summary, a protocol is a sequence of interactions between principals and 
potential penetrators of the protocol.  In strand space, each participant (regular and 
penetrator) is represented by at least one strand.  A strand is built representing each 
principal’s actions; messages sent are represented by an edge between two nodes on 
different strands.  Each node has a causal relation to other nodes in the strand space, 
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either within its own strand or to a node of another strand.  A bundle is a sub graph of the 
strand space.  Properties of bundles accommodate inductive proofs due to their partial 
ordering.  A bundle representing a protocol may include only principal strands or 
principal strands entwined with penetrator strands.  When bundles exhibit very specific 
properties, they allow assertions to be made about other strands in the protocol.  These 
assertions are made through the application of authentication tests and prove the secrecy 
or authentication of the messages and principals, respectively, involved in the interaction.  
It is also important to note that in strand space assertions made about a protocol proven 
with authentication tests will be correct regardless of the presence of penetrator strands 
within its bundle.  
24 
 
 
III. Analysis Methodology 
 
The SPKI standard provides a cryptographic framework to build secure 
applications.  The framework supplies certificates that are used for authentication, 
secrecy and authorization. However, developed with the goal of flexibility in mind, the 
SPKI standard has minimal protocol specifications.  Due to the sensitivity of information 
used in cryptographic applications, it is important for them to rely on formal proofs of the 
security properties they purport to provide.  Consequently, it is necessary to supply these 
proofs before a secure application can be relied upon. 
Furthermore, protocol design is a delicate matter.  Overlooking minor details in a 
protocol can result in exposing the cryptographic system to catastrophic intrusions.  A 
common practice is to imbed a new protocol into one that has already been proven 
correct.  However, this apparently innocuous integration can completely undermine the 
security of the existing protocol.  An example of this is the Neumann-Stubblebine 
protocol.  The Neumann-Stubblebine protocol provides proper authentication on its own; 
however, upon execution of its session resume sub-protocol, the authentication of the 
original is undermined (17). 
Since SPKI is an enabling technology, it will generally never be implemented as a 
stand-alone application, but rather, will be integrated into another application.  That 
environment will utilize its own protocols and SPKI will be adjusted to its needs.  This 
integration must be proven to supply the necessary security properties before it can be 
trusted.  To prove that the implementing application and SPKI harmonize their security 
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goals, it is necessary to prove the base protocol in an isolated environment in addition to 
in an environment running sub-protocols such as SPKI. 
This chapter identifies which components of the strand space formalism can be 
assembled to provide a proof foundation for SPKI applications.  Using this base and the 
strand space method of mixing protocol in a single analysis, the method is well-suited for 
base and sub-protocol execution in the same strand space.  Furthermore, the methodology 
guides protocol design to ensure the security properties of the primary protocol are 
retained. 
3.1 The PKI Strand Space 
Due to the unique nature of cryptographic protocols, the strand space formalism 
must be adjusted to accommodate any unique operations of a protocol before it can be 
applied in analysis.  This is done by adding additional operators to the term building logic 
and by adding new types of penetrator strands representing the actions of the added 
operators. 
 The strand space here is constructed for an environment conducive to DOD 
applications which would benefit from the security measures supplied by a public key 
infrastructure.  In particular, it is a hybrid of the strand space model used in stand-alone 
Diffie-Hellman analysis (17) and in a mixed-protocol environment (28). 
To build this strand space, the term algebra presented in Chapter 2 must be 
expanded to include PKI operations used in the Diffie-Hellman (DH) protocol (17).  This 
is accomplished by adding the disjoint subset D to the set of all terms A.  D represents 
DH exchange values.  These are the values used to coordinate the shared secret key in a 
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DH exchange and the generated key from the DH algorithm.  In addition, let H represent 
the range of a one way hash function and assume that H is another disjoint subset of A. 
The operators available on all terms must also be expanded (17).  Operators for 
hashing, signing and creating DH keys are included.  All operators of the DH strand 
space are listed in Table 2. 
Table 2 Strand space operators 
Operator Meaning Notation 
hash : A → H Injective hash function hash(t) 
encr : K × A → A  Encryption {t}k 
sign : K × A → A  Signature [t]k 
join : A × A → A Concatenation gh 
DH  : D × D → K Diffie-Hellman Calculation f(ds,dc) → k′ 
 
In addition to the term algebra, the PKI penetrator is given functionality as 
appropriate to the PKI strand space.  The new model of the penetrator defined in 
following section. 
3.1.1 PKI Penetrator. 
 The PKI penetrator model is the standard strand space penetrator, with the 
addition of public key operations in terms of the F, σ, X and H strands.  Table 3 provides 
the type of strands used to model penetrator actions. 
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Table 3 PKI penetrator strand types and signatures 
 
Strand designator and type Strand signature 
M – simple text message < +t > 
C – concatenation of terms <-g, -h, +gh> 
S – separation of terms < -gh, +g, +h > 
k – key tell < +k > 
E – encryption of terms < -k, -h, +{h}k > 
D – decryption of terms < -k, -{h}k, +h > 
σ – signature of terms < -k, -h, + [h]k > 
X – extraction of signed terms < -[h]k, +h > 
F – create fresh Diffie-Hellman value < +ds > 
H – compute injective one way hash < -g, +hash(g) >   
This model works on the assumption that the encryption being used by the regular 
strands is strong.  The strong encryption assumption is that it is impossible for the 
penetrator to guess a key used in an encryption or signature unless he already has that 
key.  Similarly, hashing functions are assumed to be irreversible and unpredictable, such 
as the MD5 (19) and SHA-1 (20). 
3.3 Protocol Independence though Disjoint Encryption 
In order to mix two or more protocols successfully, it must be proven that each 
protocol is safe in isolation and that the execution of all protocols together is also safe.  
One way to accomplish the latter is to prove that the protocols to be mixed are 
independent of one another.  If so, then it can be concluded without further proofs that all 
security properties a protocol exhibits in isolation are also valid in the mixed 
environment. 
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Protocol independence requires further extensions to the strand space formalism.  
These were introduced in (28) as the concept of respect, but have been refined (21) to 
form a more thorough model called independence. 
Two crucial definitions are those of privacy and fullness.  An atomic value 
is said to be private in Σ if it never originates in the set of secondary strands ΣKTa U∈ 2 
or the set of penetrator strands ΣP.  If it is not private, then it is considered public.  
Furthermore, a concatenated value gh is public if g and h are public and an encrypted 
value {h}k is public if h and k are.  Additionally, a strand space Σ is said to be full if 
every atomic value  that originates on ΣKTa U∈ 2 also originates on some M-strand or 
K-strand in Σ.  Intuitively, this defines a strand space with a penetrator that is fully 
capable of listening to messages and operating with them according to his defined 
actions.  Thus, a full strand space is one with a penetrator strand entwined with regular 
strands to accommodate the full extent of the penetrator’s abilities. 
Disjoint Outbound Encryption – A strand space Σ has DOE if and only if given a 
positive node n1 ∈  Σ1, a negative node n2 ∈  Σ2 and a private term a {h}k such that 
{h}k  term(n1) and {h}k  term(n2), then there is no positive node  such that 
n
xn
2
+⇒ xn  and a occurs in a new component of  (21). xn
Disjoint Inbound Encryption – A strand space Σ has DIE if for all negative n1∈Σ1, 
positive n2∈Σ2 and for all  {h}k, if {h}k  term(n1), then {h}k  t0 for any new 
component t0 of n2 (21).
Disjoint Encryption – A strand space Σ has disjoint encryption if it has both 
disjoint inbound and disjoint outbound encryption (21). 
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If Σ is full and has disjoint encryption, then Σ1 is independent of the set Σ2.  A 
simple case of independence occurs when the set of keys used to encrypt terms in Σ1 are 
disjoint from those used in Σ2.  Intuitively, if no similar keys are used by both protocols, 
then independence is trivially true as the conditions are never challenged. 
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IV. An Analysis of the TLS Protocol 
4.1 Transport Layer Security Protocol 
Arguably one of the most widely used protocols in secure Internet 
communications is the Transport Layer Security protocol (TLS) (22: 1-2).  TLS is a 
layered protocol designed to provide secret communication between two principals while 
offering the ability to authenticate each participant (23). 
The two layers of the TLS protocol are the TLS Handshake protocol and the TLS 
Record protocol.  The Handshake protocol is used to allow the principals to agree on 
what protocols to use for symmetric key generation.  The Record protocol then uses the 
newly generated symmetric key to exchange information securely.  RFC 2246 specifies 
the Change Cipher Spec and Alert protocols, in addition to the Handshake and Record 
protocols; however, for this work the functionality of these are assumed to be subsumed 
by the Handshake protocol. 
The TLS Handshake protocol is a simple protocol designed to coordinate the 
usage of other protocols.  During the Handshake protocol, principals negotiate not only 
which key exchange protocol to use, but also the parameters to use while running these 
sub-protocols.  The two sub-protocols used for key exchange are the Diffie-Hellman 
public key agreement protocol and the RSA key exchange protocol (24).  Once agreed 
upon, the key exchange protocol is executed as a sub-protocol.  After a session key is 
generated from a successful key agreement protocol, the Handshake protocol concludes 
and TLS protocol will continue by executing  the Record protocol or abort as is 
appropriate. 
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To apply strand space, the TLS protocol was abstracted into Dolev-Yao style 
terms (15).  The abstraction allows the strand space proofs to reason how the protocol 
operates rather than obfuscate the analysis with implementation details. 
The model used in this analysis was designed to focus on the interaction of 
cryptographic terms in the TLS protocol.  Thus, the details of clear text messages 
identified in the TLS standard (23) are abstracted to a simple terms as they have limited 
impact on the underlying cryptography.  A similar abstraction was made in (17). 
The TLS protocol itself is abstracted into one of two base protocols, either the 
SAP, Server Authentication Protocol (Figure 2) or the SCAP, Server & Client 
Authentication Protocol (Figure 3).  Sub-protocols executed within the context of these 
base protocols are the Resume Session (Figure 4) and the Certificate Chain Validation 
protocols. 
4.1.1 TLS: Server Authentication Protocol. 
The TLS Server Authentication protocol is depicted in Figure 2.  The client 
initiates the exchange by sending a message with two components in order to negotiate 
which protocol to use for the key exchange.  Tc is a list of client-supported protocols and 
parameters.  If the client desires to resume an old session, it also sends the preferred 
session ID, Sc.  However, most frequently the Sc message is a null message, indicating a 
new session needs to be established.  This first exchange is a minimized representation of 
the ClientHello message in the TLS standard (23).  Tc is assumed to include DH. 
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Figure 2 TLS Server Authentication 
 
The server either recognizes the old session ID and executes the Resume Session 
protocol, or it continues on.  If the server continues with the Server Authentication 
protocol, the server responds with Ts to specify the protocols and parameters to be used 
for the remainder of the exchange.  The server also sends the session ID, Ss, to be used as 
a reference for this connection.  Ts is assumed to specify DH.
 Additionally, the server replies with a certificate chain, ks[], of SPKI certificates 
detailing its identity.  Each link of the chain is a certificate that binds the server’s public 
key to a name or authorization.  The chain in its entirety, ks[], is a logical implication of 
certificates proving the server’s identity from a client-verifiable source. 
Furthermore, the fresh DH values are signed with the server’s private key and 
presented to the client to negotiate a shared secret.  These exchanges represent the 
ServerHello, Certificate, ServerKeyExchange and ServerHelloDone messages defined in 
the TLS standard. 
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The third message is the unsigned DH response, dc, and a hashed message digest, 
End[client].  The digest is signed with the newly calculated shared secret k′.  This 
exchange represents the ClientKeyExchange, ChangeCipherSpec, and ClientFinished 
messages. 
The final exchange returns a hashed digest, End[server], that allows the client to 
verify the details of the exchange were done according to the standard and that there have 
been no alterations. 
The strand space traces of the principals in this protocol, Client and Server, are 
provided in Table 4.  They are identical with the exception that their signs are reversed.   
Table 4 Server Authentication Protocol Principals 
Principal Signature Strand Trace 
Client[Tc, Sc, Ts, Ss, ks[], ds, dc] + Tc, Sc, -TsSsks[][ds]ks, +dc{End[]}k′, -{End[]}k′  
Server[Tc, Sc, Ts, Ss, ks[], ds, dc] − Tc, Sc, +TsSsks[][ds]ks, -dc{End[]}k′, +{End[]}k′  
 
4.1.2 TLS: Server & Client Authentication Protocol. 
The Server & Client Authentication version, shown in Figure 3, is only subtly 
different from the previous protocol.  The Server adds an additional request, Tcert, 
specifying what type of certificate must be produced by the client to complete the 
exchange.  Furthermore, the client returns a certificate chain of its own kc[] and signs its 
half of the DH value with a private key.  The exchange then ends just as the Server 
Authentication protocol does. 
 
 
34 
 
 
Figure 3 TLS Server & Client Authentication 
 
The strand traces for regular principals for the Server & Client Authentication 
protocol are provided in Table 5. 
Table 5 Server and Client Authentication Protocol Principals 
Principal Signature Strand Trace 
Client[Tc, Sc, Ts, Ss ks[], ds, kc[], dc] + TcSc, -TsTcertSsks[][ds]ks, 
+kc[][dc]kc{End[]}k′, -{End[]}k′  
Server[Tc, Sc, Ts, Ss ks[], kc[], ds, dc] −  TcSc, -TsTcertSsks[][ds]ks, 
-kc[][dc]kc{End[]}k′, +{End[]}k′  
 
4.1.3 TLS: Resume Session Protocol. 
The final TLS protocol being analyzed is the Resume Session protocol.  Unlike 
the other two, this protocol can only be executed following a successful execution of 
either the Server Authentication or Server & Client Authentication protocol.  Instead of 
establishing a new session ID, this exchange restarts a session based on a previously 
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negotiated secret key.  The ability for the server to decline a resume request and the hash 
message digest End[] are the controls of this protocol to prevent abuse and limit 
feasibility of attacks.  The strand space trace is depicted in Figure 4 and principal traces 
in Table 6. 
Table 6 Resume Session Protocol Principals 
Principal Signature Strand Trace 
Client[Tc, Sc, Ts, Ss] + Tc, Sc, -TsSs{End[]}k′, +{End[]}k′  
Server[Tc, Sc, Ts, Ss] −  Tc, Sc, +TsSs{End[]}k′, -{End[]}k′  
 
 
Figure 4 Resume Session 
 
The End[] function warrants further explanation.  First, as mentioned above, it is a 
symbolic representation of the final messages sent between participants in the TLS 
protocol.  The actual composition of these messages varies depending on the negotiated 
parameters; however, the properties remain the same.  Each is constructed using a mix of 
pseudo-random functions, MD5, and SHA hashes.  It is assumed that these digest values 
uniquely originate at their source node.  A message produced by a server is constructed 
with a label indicating as such, whereas a message created by a client is also 
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appropriately labeled before the hashing takes place to prevent the confusion, replay 
attack or replacement of one instance with another. 
The uniqueness of each instance of the End[] function can be illustrated with the 
composition of its inputs.  An example of a set of inputs would include the generated 
session key k′, a specification of what role the message is being sent under (client or 
server), then an ordered array of previously sent messages history[] and an array of 
previously sent secrets secrets[].  The result of this function is a uniquely originating 
value Nx that is unpredictable to a penetrator but reproducible by a principal with all the 
correct information.  The input and outputs of the End[] function are illustrated in Table 7. 
Table 7 End[] Function Inputs for Server & Client Authentication Protocol 
Message  Input History[]  Secrets[] Output 
3 k′, client,  
history[], 
secrets[] 
TsSs,  
TsSsTcert ks[][ds] ks 
 
k′ N0 
4 k′, server, 
history[], 
secrets[] 
TsSs,  
TsSsTcert ks[][ds]ks, 
kc[][dc] kc{ N0}k′ 
k′, 
N0 
N1 
x k′, <role> 
history[] 
secrets 
TsSs,  
TsSsTcert ks[][ds]ks, 
kc[][dc] kc{ N0}k′ … 
…{Nx-1}k′ 
k′, 
N0, … 
… Nx-1 
Nx 
 
The aim of the End function is to provide a unique, secure, non-reversible digest.  
A received digest can then be compared to a self-generated one in order to confirm all the 
messages and secrets shared between two principals.  Although there have been recent 
concerns with the MD5 hash (25; 26), it is still considered to be a safe means of creating 
digests. 
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4.2 SPKI Integration into TLS 
During the analysis, reference to TLS will imply a reference to the abstract 
Handshake protocol as described below.  The SAP and SCAP are assumed to be the base 
protocols and will be executed using the Diffie-Hellman key agreement algorithm using 
SPKI name certificates in place of X.509 certificates. 
TLS currently uses X.509 certificates, which are functionally identical to SPKI 
name certificates.  Consequently, SPKI certifications can be easily substituted (27).  
Furthermore, the strand space theory is ideal for the analysis of public key protocols and 
in particular to the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol (17).  The integrity of TLS 
executing with sub-protocols is a concern; however, it fits the model of the mixed strand 
space formalism defined in (28) and can be analyzed in a mixed strand space. 
4.2.1 Certificate Chain Validation Protocol Design. 
In the standard TLS, there is no way for the client to specify what type of 
certificate he requires the server to supply for authentication.  In practice, this is 
accommodated by the use of global or far-reaching certificate authorities that are for the 
most part universally recognized.  In an SPKI TLS application, an unprompted certificate 
chain may end at a certificate authority the client has no knowledge of.  To accommodate 
this problem, it will be assumed that the initial message exchange used to coordinate 
which protocols to use will also coordinate a certificate base for the server to provide a 
certificate chain.  For example, the standard ClientHello message contains two arrays 
specifying cipher suites and compression methods (23:34-35).  To accommodate SPKI 
TLS, a third array of high level authorities can be included to identify which sources of 
trust this client will work with.  Thus, the server still retains the option of choosing how 
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the connection is made, what methods of security to implement and in addition can 
decide if it can provide a certificate chain to any of the client’s known authorities.  
Adding this certificate chain to this analysis is hidden by the degree of abstraction; 
however, if it were explicitly represented it would appear in the first message sent from 
the client concatenated with Tc (Figure 3). 
Furthermore, the standard TLS protocol assumes that certificates can be validated 
offline.  However, realistically, offline validation introduces security concerns in the form 
of stale revocation lists and compromised keys.  To overcome these problems, certificates 
can be checked online, thus eliminating delays in revocation and validation.  TLS can use 
SPKI to solve this problem if it is augmented to accommodate the frequent validation of 
certificates via the SPKI hierarchy of certificate authorities.  This will necessarily include 
the addition of a protocol between a client and an authority which may need to execute as 
a sub-protocol.  The inclusion of this protocol will allow TLS to accommodate online 
validation.  The SPKI standard currently has no protocol specification for certificate 
chain validation, and thus one is developed here and will be integrated into the TLS 
model used in analysis. 
The term certificate chain discovery appears in several contexts with regard to 
SPKI and thus it is important to distinguish them.  First, the SPKI standard provides a 
tractable algorithm called Certificate Chain Discovery for a principal to sift through 
owned certificates in order to provide a minimal certificate chain.  The second use of this 
term is in the TLS standard.  A principal uses certificate chains, similar to those of SPKI, 
to trace a certificate from its CA to the principal providing it.  In order to avoid 
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confusion, the protocol designed here for certificate chain discovery will be called the 
Certificate Chain Validation protocol (CCV). 
CCV requires two regular participants, a solicitor and an authority.  It is assumed 
that the authority is an issuer of certificates, whereas the solicitor is providing a 
certificate to be verified. 
The solicitor requires the authority to be authenticated.  By authenticating the 
authority, the solicitor is assured of the authority’s identity and hence assured of that 
authority’s response to the validity of the certificates.  It is assumed that a regular 
principal playing the role of the authority will respond only to certificates it has created 
and will respond only with accurate assessments of presented certificates. 
The following procedure uses authentication tests as a guide to protocol design 
(29).  To satisfy the security goals of the CCV protocol, the solicitor provides an 
incoming test for the authority to validate.  The easiest method of supplying a test is to 
provide a certificate verifiable by the authority along with a nonce Ns to be returned 
signed with the authority’s private key.  If the set of keys used in CCV is not known to 
the penetrator and the incoming test is returned then, this test verifies the certificate.  By 
Theorem 2 it is deduced that only a regular participant could have returned a signed 
certificate validation.  Based on the assumed behavior of regular principals, only a 
certificate authority would sign and return such a value.  Furthermore, the only certificate 
authority with the nonce Ns and access to the private key corresponding to the certificate 
being validated is the principal acting as the authority.  Therefore, the certificate is 
validated by the authority and the solicitor can continue with the remaining certificates 
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until the chain is completely verified.  The strand space representation of the CCV 
protocol is depicted in Figure 5 and the principal traces are in Table 8. 
 
Figure 5 Certificate Chain Validation Protocol 
 
Table 8 Certificate Chain Validation Protocol Principals 
Principal Signature Strand Trace 
Solicitor[NS kc[]] +  NS kc[],- [NS kc[]]ka  
Authority[NS kc[]] −  NS kc[],+ [NS kc[]]ka  
4.3 TLS Strand Space Analysis 
Analysis of the TLS strand space proceeds as follows.  Strand space proofs are 
applied to the base protocols of TLS in isolation to prove their security properties.  Next, 
the sub-protocols operating under the base model are proven to have protocol 
independence.  This allows the conclusion that all security properties of the TLS protocol 
are maintained even when operating with the CCV and Resume Session protocols. 
The theorems below prove authentication for the TLS base protocols, Server 
Authentication Protocol and Server & Client Authentication protocol.  All of the 
following proofs assume the conditions listed in Table 9. 
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Table 9 Strand space assumptions 
A bundle  over the TLS strand space 
Signed messages and encryption form a disjoint set to the set of keys used in the 
protocol 
The set of keys known to the penetrator KP is disjoint from the set of keys K 
The set of penetrator known DH values is disjoint from those used in the protocol 
Hashing functions are chosen such that they are computationally infeasible to find 
two distinct inputs which hash to a common value and if given a hash value, it is 
similarly infeasible to predict the inputs (30) 
The Diffie-Hellman problem is hard 
 
 Theorem 1 Origination of Cryptographic Terms 
If k ∈  K, and for all nodes in , k is never a sub-term of that node, then any term 
h ∈  A signed or encrypted with k must originate on a regular strand. 
Proof:  If {h}k or [h]k originate on an adversary strand, they must originate on 
either an E or σ strand, as they are the only strands that create new cryptographic terms.  
For these strands to do this, k ∈  KP.  However, this contradicts the assumption that KP is 
disjoint from the set K. 
Theorem 2 Signature Origination 
If k ∈  K, and for all nodes in , k is never a sub-term of that node, then for any 
[h]k ∈  A, if [h]k originates on any node then there is exactly one regular principal that 
created that value, and furthermore the principal associated with the originating strand 
corresponds to the public key used to read h. 
Proof: Based on Theorem 1, [h]k must originate on a regular strand.  Furthermore, 
only regular strands have access to their own private keys.  Thus, since each principal is 
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represented uniquely by the inverse of their private key, any term signed is guaranteed to 
come from exactly one principal strand in the strand space. 
4.3.1 Isolated TLS. 
Theorem 3 SAP Authentication 
Let  be a bundle consisting of SAP Client, SAP Server, and penetrator strands.  
Assume that k′ is not known to the penetrator.  Then, if  contains some strand Client[Tc, 
Sc, Ts, Ss, ks[], ds, dc] then  must also contain a strand Server[Tc, Sc, Ts, Ss, ks[], ds, dc] 
with a height of four whose identity is associated with the public key ks.  Furthermore, the 
server’s actions are explicitly in response to the client’s and all messages of the protocol 
are received un-altered. 
Proof:  The second message of the protocol contains a signed DH constructor.  
Based on Theorem 2, the reception of this term by the client assures the client that this 
DH constructor was created by the server whose public key is ks.  Knowing that this was 
created by that particular server, however, is not sufficient: it must also be proven that the 
message was produced with the intent to continue this particular run of the protocol.  This 
is accomplished with an authentication test. 
The edge connecting n2 and n3 of the client strand is an outgoing test for the value 
of the End[] function, N0.  The test component for this authentication test is thus {N0}k′.  
Since the DH problem is  hard, the only two principals capable of creating the key k′ are 
those participating in the exchange.  Furthermore, because N0 is an ingredient of k′, the 
only two principals capable of creating N0, are also those participating in the exchange.  
Since regular principals act according to the protocol and according to a regular protocol 
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run, N0 is only contained in this encrypted message.  Therefore, it can be deduced that N0 
uniquely originates at node n3 of the client strand.   
Additionally, the test component {N0}k′ never appears as a proper sub-term of any 
regular component.  Assume for a moment that {N0}k′ is a proper sub-term of test 
components which use it as an ingredient.  As a sub-term, {N0}k′  is obtainable through 
some combination of decryption, separation, joining or concatenation.  In the SAP 
protocol, the only use of {N0}k′  is as an ingredient to the hash functions.  Thus, to obtain 
this component, the inverse of the End[] function must be calculated.  However, this 
contradicts the assumption that the hash functions used are probabilistically unpredictable 
and irreversible.  Therefore, {N0}k′  is not a proper sub-term of any node in the bundle. 
To fulfill the outgoing test, the server must decipher the message and return N0 in 
a context outside of the encryption it was received in, i.e. the server must provide a 
transforming edge on the test component.  This is accomplished in message four sent by 
the server between nodes n3 and n4.  The new context is provided by the End[] function 
result N1.  Using N0 as an ingredient for N1, it is presented in a new context only 
producible by principals who know the key k′.  By returning N1, the server proves that he 
has deciphered the message and created a response to the test component recently. 
To review, the original test component of message three is never the sub-term of a 
previous node, its sub-terms uniquely originate on the node sending it and the sub-term 
N0 is returned in a new context outside of the sent component.  Therefore, this component 
qualifies as a test component, nodes n3 to n4 represent an outgoing test and thus the client 
authenticates the server as not only the server associated with the key ks, but also the 
other participant in this particular protocol execution. 
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Furthermore, since regular participants only act according to protocol 
specifications, the only server node that produces a message of this composition is n4.  
Therefore the server strand must have a height of at least four.  Additionally, because the 
history array used to build N1 includes all previously sent messages and is built with 
secret values only known by the participants of this protocol, the client is provided with 
the guarantee that all messages sent and received have not been altered by a third party.  
If the messages where altered, the verification of hash values would reveal this and the 
protocol would not continue.   
Thus, the SAP protocol assures the client of three things: first, the server’s 
identity is that associated with ks; second, that server is executing this protocol in 
response to the client’s requests and not some other run of the protocol; and third, all four 
messages are received un-altered by any third party. 
Theorem 4 SCAP Server Authentication 
Let  be a bundle consisting of SCAP Client, SCAP Server, and penetrator 
strands.   Then, if  contains some strand Client[Tc, Sc, Ts, Ss, ks[], ds, kc[], dc] then  
must also contain a strand Server[Tc, Sc, Ts, Ss, ks[], kc[], ds, dc] with a height of four 
whose identity is associated with the public key ks.  Furthermore, the server’s actions are 
explicitly in response to the client’s and all messages of the protocol are received un-
altered. 
 Proof:  The proof for this theorem is analogous to that of Theorem 3.  The only 
cryptographic difference in the SCAP and SAP protocols is that the DH constructor 
provided by the client is now a signed term.  However, that signed term only becomes 
important when proving client authentication. 
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  To begin, the signed DH constructor supplied by the server provides the client with 
sufficient proof that the sender of that term was the server associated with the key ks via 
Theorem 2.   
Similarly, {N0}k′ provides an authentication test for the server.  Through the same 
logic as before, this component is never the sub-term of a previous node, its sub-terms 
uniquely originate on the node sending it and the sub-term N0 is returned in a new 
context outside the sent component.  Consequently, the client can authenticate the server 
as participating in this particular execution of the protocol and as the particular server 
associated with ks.  
Once again the composition of the message digest provides a guarantee of 
message agreement.  Thus, the SCAP protocol assures the client that the server is ks, is 
running this protocol in response to the client’s messages, and all messages have been 
received un-altered.  
Because the SCAP protocol is designed to provide mutual authentication it is also 
necessary to prove that SCAP authenticates the existence of a particular client given a 
server strand. 
Theorem 5 SCAP Client Authentication 
Let  be a bundle consisting of SCAP Client, SCAP Server and penetrator 
strands.  Assume that k′ is not known to the penetrator.  Then, if  contains some strand 
Server[Tc, Sc, Ts, Ss, ks[], kc[], ds, dc], then  must also contain a strand Client[Tc, Sc, 
Ts, Ss, ks[], ds, kc[], dc] of height at least three. 
Proof:  Theorem 2 allows the server to identify the DH constructor supplied in 
message three as an incoming value provided at some previous time by the client 
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associated with the public key kc.  However, authentication once again must be deduced 
from an authentication test via a test component. 
The authentication takes place between nodes n2 and n3 of the server strand and is 
an incoming test.  In this case the test value a is message digest N0. 
The test value N0 encrypted with k′ is the test component that fulfills the incoming 
authentication test.  To qualify as a test component, {N0}k′ must not be the proper sub-
term of any other term in the bundle and must contain a uniquely originating value as a 
sub-term.  Using the same logic as in Theorems 3 and 4 this component is not a proper 
sub-term of any term in . 
To show that N0 is a uniquely originating value, recall that the ingredients of N0 
include the generated secret key k′.  Because the DH problem is hard, the only principals 
that know this key are the regular principals executing this protocol.  Therefore, the 
generation of the digest using this key is a unique value.  Furthermore, since regular 
principals act only according to the protocol standard, through inspection of the strand 
trace it can be seen that only the client strand will create the message digest N0.  Thus, the 
test value N0 is a uniquely originating value in the strand space. 
Additionally, for the same reasons as shown in previous theorems, N0 also 
provides agreement on all previously sent messages.  Thus, the server is assured the client 
is that associated with the key kc, is responding to this particular execution of the 
protocol, agrees with the first three messages of the SCAP protocol and is of height at 
least three. 
As an interesting side note, despite the strong agreement on the first three 
messages the server has no guarantee the client receives the last message.  Because there 
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is no response to the final message, let alone one including a means of authentication, it is 
impossible for the server to know if the client received the last message.  This, however, 
does nothing to weaken the authentication of the previous messages and is more of an 
inconvenience peculiar to the sender of the final message of a protocol. 
4.3.2 Isolated Resume. 
Theorem 6 Resume Server Authentication 
Let  be a bundle consisting of Resume Session client, server and penetrator 
strands in addition to SCAP or SAP strands.  If  contains some client strand Client[Tc, 
Sc, Ts, Ss] then  must also contain a strand Server[Tc, Sc, Ts, Ss] of height at least two 
that agrees on all messages of a particular SCAP or SAP protocol. 
Proof:  The edge connecting nodes n1 and n2 acts as an incoming authentication 
test to authenticate the server to the client.  The test value is the result of the message 
digest Nx+1, where x is the number of previously sent message digests from the protocol 
session being resumed.  The test component for this test is the encrypted portion of 
message 2, {Nx+1}k′.  To be a test component, it cannot by a proper sub-term of any other 
messages in  and must contain a value a that uniquely originates on the n1. 
Assume {Nx+1}k′ is a proper sub-term of a message in .  Through observation it 
is clear that this component is not included in any other message other than as an 
ingredient.  In particular as an ingredient in message digest Nx+2.  To extract this from the 
digest the DH key k′ must be compromised and the digest must be reversed.  However, 
this contradicts the assumption that the DH problem is hard and that the hash functions 
are irreversible.  Thus {Nx+1}k′ is not a proper sub-term of any other messages in . 
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The node n1 does not supply explicitly a uniquely originating value, however, it 
does provide a constructor such a value.  Message one of the protocol provides an 
additional entry to the history[] array used to compose Nx+1.  Based on the assumption 
that hash functions are unpredictable Nx+1 must be a uniquely originating value. 
Therefore, the component {Nx+1}k′ is a test component for the incoming test over 
the nodes n1 and n2 of the client strand and nodes n1 and n2 of the server strand are the 
transforming edge which satisfy the test.  This allows the client to conclude that this 
execution of the Resume protocol is in response to the messages the client initiated. 
A validated message digest, as discussed in previous theorems, indicates 
agreement on all previously sent messages.  In this case a message digest will be built 
with the messages from a previous SCAP or SAP session.  Because both of these 
protocols authenticate the server, the successful execution of either reveals to the client 
the identity of the server, ks, via Theorem 3 or Theorem 4 respectively. 
Thus, given a client strand, there must exist a server strand of at least height two 
that is participating in this particular execution of the protocol, is authenticated as the 
server corresponding to the public key ks of the resumed session and agrees on all 
previously sent messages of the same resumed session. 
Theorem 7 Resume Client Authentication. 
Let  be a bundle consisting of Resume Session client, server and penetrator 
strands in addition to either SCAP or SAP strands containing a complete run of the 
respective protocol.  If  contains some server strand Server[Tc, Sc, Ts, Ss] then  must 
also contain some strand Client[Tc, Sc, Ts, Ss] that agrees on all messages of resumed 
protocol. 
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Proof:  This proof is very similar to that of Theorem 3.   The test being 
accomplished is an outgoing test over the nodes n2 and n3.  The test value is Nx+1 and the 
test component is {Nx+1}k′, where x is the number of previously sent message digests 
from the protocol session being resumed.  Based on the same arguments for the message 
digest in Theorem 3, this value is not a proper sub-term and contains a uniquely 
originating value in the digest Nx+1.  
 The corresponding client strand must extract this value and return it in a new 
context via a transforming edge.  This is done in message three between nodes n2 and n3 
of the client strand.  The new context is provided by the digest Nx+2.  Because this value 
uses the test value as an ingredient and is encrypted with the shared secret key k′, the 
client proves that he has deciphered the message and created an appropriate response to 
the test.  Therefore, this component authenticates the client as the principal executing the 
other half of this particular protocol run. 
The identity of the client, however, is a more delicate matter.  Through inspection 
of the history array used in constructing message digests, the server can search for a 
client supplied DH constructor.  If the included strands are SCAP strands, then the DH 
constructor will be signed with the key kc.  In this case, the server can authenticate not 
only that the client is running this particular session of the protocol but also that the 
client’s identity is that associated with kc.  On the other hand, if the strands are a SAP 
execution, then the DH constructor is not signed and the best the server can do is to 
guarantee that this execution is being accomplished with the same client as the resumed 
protocol, but cannot authenticate the identity of that client. 
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4.3.3 Isolated CCV. 
Theorem 8 CCV Authentication. 
Let  be a bundle consisting of CCV Solicitor, CCV Authority and penetrator 
strands then, if  contains some strand Solicitor[NS kc[]], then  must also contain a 
strand Authority [NS kc[]] and the assessment of the link of the certificate chain, kc[], is 
accurate. 
Proof:  This protocol was built with an authentication test in mind and thus is a 
relatively straight forward proof.  The test value is the uniquely originating nonce Ns 
supplied in message one of the protocol.  It is assumed that the solicitor can provide an 
unpredictable nonce Ns such that the value is uniquely originating.  The authentication 
test is an incoming test over the edges n1 and n2.  The test component returned is the 
entire second message of the protocol {Nskc[]}ka.  Furthermore, due to the simplicity of 
the protocol from inspection it can be seen that no other messages contain the component 
{Nskc[]}ka as a sub-term.  Thus, the component qualifies as a test component because it 
includes a uniquely originating value and is not a sub-term of any other message in . 
In order to complete this incoming test, the authority must provide a transforming 
edge.  The new value Ns is received in the clear-text of message one.  It is placed in a new 
cryptographic context within the test component thus satisfying the transforming edge 
and completing the authentication test.   Theorem 2 applied to message two identifies the 
authority as the particular principal associated with ka. 
Therefore, the solicitor, through an incoming test, authenticates the authority as 
running this protocol in response to the protocol initiation by the solicitor and the 
authority is the particular principal associated with the key ka.  Recall the assumption 
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originally made in Section 4.2.1 that a regular principal playing the role of the authority 
will respond only to certificates it has created and will respond only with accurate 
assessments of presented certificates.  Based on this assumption, the assessment of this 
link of the certificate chain is valid.  Thus, given a solicitor strand executing the CCV 
protocol, there exists an authority ka that corresponds with that particular execution of the 
protocol and provides a valid certificate assessment. 
4.4 TLS Protocol Independence 
To prove protocol independence the base and the sub-protocols must be compared 
against the properties required for disjoint encryption.  The two base protocols will be the 
SAP and the SCAP protocols.  To prove that each protocol execution is independent, it is 
required to prove that the two base protocols are independent of each sub-protocol.  Once 
these relationships are proven to be independent, it can be concluded that the TLS 
protocol running CCV and Resume protocols have the same security properties as the 
TLS protocol running in isolation.   
4.4.1 SAP, Resume & CCV. 
To prove that the SAP-Resume-CCV strand space retains the security properties 
of the SAP strand space, it must be shown that all secondary strands exhibit disjoint 
encryption with SAP.  The set of secondary strands Σ2 consists of a proper subset of the 
strands from the Resume (Σres) and CCV (Σccv) protocols. 
To begin, the CCV protocol was designed to provide the needed security 
assurances while avoiding potential problems with the SAP protocol.  Consequently, it 
shares no terms either as sub-terms or terms with the same signature as those in the SAP 
52 
 
protocol.  Similarly, it does not originate any texts or keys vital to the privacy of the 
primary protocol.  That is to say, there are no encrypted terms t such that t  term(n1) and 
t  term(n2), for n1∈Σ1 and n2∈Σccv.  The same is true for disjoint inbound encryption.  
Therefore, the CCV exhibits disjoint encryption with the SAP. 
To complete the proof, the set of strands of the Resume Session protocol must 
also be proven to be disjoint with the SAP.  No new components of the Resume Session 
protocol contain, as sub-terms, private values from the SAP protocol.  The construction 
of the message digest uses private values, however, they are not retrievable from the 
components, and thus not considered sub-terms.  Therefore, there is no positive node in  
Σres that uses private values as sub-term of new components, therefore, the Resume 
Session protocol exhibits disjoint outbound encryption with respect to SAP.   
For disjoint inbound encryption there cannot be a node such that a private 
encryption occurs as a new component on Σres that also occurs on the SAP.  The only 
encrypted component generated by the Resume Session protocol is {End[server]}k′.  
Although this component matches the signature of components found in the primary 
protocol, i.e. in messages three and four, the nature of the End function means that this is 
a new component.  That is to say that this is a uniquely originating component that is 
distinguishable from all other occurrences of the message {End[server]}k′.  
Consequently, the Resume Session protocol exhibits disjoint outbound encryption. 
Since the Resume Session protocol exhibits both inbound and outbound disjoint 
encryption it also exhibits disjoint encryption.  Furthermore because all subsets of Σ2 
exhibit disjoint encryption with SAP, Σ2 exhibits disjoint encryption with SAP. 
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Finally, since no atomic text or key originates on secondary nodes of the mixed 
strand space, there is an equivalent strand space which has an arbitrary amount of M and 
K strands.  Since these values are incapable of interacting with the Σ2, the strand space is 
said to be full.  Therefore, all protocols of the mixed SAP strand space are considered to 
be independent. Thus, all properties of these protocols are preserved when executing the 
SAP with Resume Session and CCV as sub-protocols. 
4.4.2 SCAP, Resume & CCV. 
The proof of protocol independence for the SCAP is identical to that of the SAP 
proof.   This is provable by identifying the difference in terms of the SAP and SCAP 
protocols and showing that these provide no new terms that interfere with disjoint 
encryption in the sub-protocols. 
Table 10 Term differences in TLS base protocols 
New Term in SCAP Corresponding term in SAP 
Tcert - 
kc[] - 
[dc]kc dc 
 
The terms which differ in the SCAP and the SCAP are identified in Table 10.  
None of these terms are secret values and they share no common signatures with the sub-
protocols Resume Session and CCV.  Therefore, Σ2 exhibits disjoint outbound 
encryption.  Similarly, since none of these are private encryptions, there cannot be a new 
component in Σ2 that produces a private encryption that is in this set.  Therefore Σ2 also 
exhibits disjoint inbound encryption.  Furthermore, the set of secondary strands Σ2 
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exhibits disjoint encryption to the SCAP.  The same reasoning as above allows this mixed 
strand space to be considered full.  Finally, a full strand space with disjoint encryption 
exhibits protocol independence.  Consequently, the SCAP protocol is independent of the 
Resume Session and CCV protocols and thus the mixed strand space that contains all of 
these protocols exhibits the same properties as any of the protocols in isolation.
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V. Final Words 
5.1 Summary 
The goal of this work was to assemble a method to integrate the Simple Public 
Key Infrastructure (SPKI) into an application and provide security analysis of the result.  
Strand space authentication tests were used to provide a guide to SPKI application 
design.  The authentication tests supplied a well-grounded formal method of protocol 
generation and analysis.  The result was that the security properties of the new protocol 
designed were direct implications of the security goals. 
Overall, strand space was found to be an excellent tool for SPKI analysis because 
it provided an explicit model of PKI protocol environments as well as a means for 
analyzing the protocols interacting with one another.  In unison, these properties are an 
ideal model for SPKI protocol design and analysis. 
As a demonstration of the assembled model, SPKI was integrated into the 
Transport Layer Security protocol.  The TLS protocol was chosen due to its popularity, 
its security goals, and its reliance on a PKI.  The two TLS protocols examined where the 
Server Authentication Protocol and the Server & Client Authentication protocol.  As 
anticipated, each was proven in isolation to provide authentication to their respective 
principals. 
The strand space based method of authentication tests as a means of protocol 
design furthered the example by providing a way to integrate SPKI functionality into the  
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TLS protocol.  Authentication tests were used to create the Certificate Chain Validation 
protocol used to validate certificates being used by the TLS protocol. 
Furthermore, utilizing the ability of strand space to analyze multiple protocols 
operating in the same environment TLS was proven to be independent of its sub-
protocols.  This then led to the proofs that TLS running its own Session Resume protocol 
and the newly created CCV protocol has the same security properties as TLS operating in 
isolation. 
5.2 Future Work 
5.2.1 Security Policy Design. 
A key feature of SPKI is its ability to delegate authority for access control, 
certificate distribution or any other definable authorization.  Due to this flexibility, there 
is the additional concern of security policy design.  When is it reasonable to delegate an 
authorization?  Furthermore, is there an ideal method for developing the hierarchy of 
delegation?  Perhaps an inductive proof method can be derived to establish a logic for 
building the desired hierarchy or possibly a means of recursively building and checking 
the tree during policy design and certificate distribution. 
5.2.3 Performance Based Analysis. 
Using SPKI in place of other public key technologies may result in additional 
overhead.  One such overhead could be excessive network traffic.  In the TLS example 
explored above, execution of the certificate chain validation protocol will result in 
network traffic.  If each principal of a network is required to check a dozen certificates 
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per interaction the network traffic may build.  A model of this traffic and the demands it 
places on a network could be a valid topic of future SPKI research.  
5.2.4 Hardware Demands. 
Since the SPKI standard allows for principals to create their own keys, will this 
place further demands on the hardware necessary for SPKI applications, and if so to what 
extent?  If a central key authority is to issue keys and certificates, what will be the 
network congestion as a result of requests to verify generated certificates or keys? 
5.2 Conclusions 
SPKI is an intriguing and flexible standard that provides an excellent framework 
for PKC.  Due to the brevity of its specification, a good deal of care must be taken in 
application integration.  However, if attention is paid to an application’s desired security 
goals SPKI can offer a provable and flexible solution. 
The strand space theory has proven to be an invaluable tool both in the analysis of 
protocols and their design.  Strand space graphs are a clear and concise means of 
representing both simple and obscure protocols.  Furthermore, the inductive nature of 
strand space proofs provide not only analysis of protocol correctness, but also reasoning 
why a protocol may fail.  This concept can then be carried into the analysis and 
construction of new protocols to avoid the same security problems in the future. 
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Appendix A:  Strand Space Protocol Example 
The following is the strand space representation of the Simple Protocol.  The 
Simple Protocol consists of two brothers, Cyril and Dmitri passing information to and 
from one another.  Dmitri begins by asking Cyril to send him the location of their secret 
hideout (M1).  Cyril responds by encrypting a message detailing where the hideout is 
using Dmitri’s public key,{M2}KD.  Dmitri in turn encrypts a new message telling Cyril 
what to bring to the hideout at their next meeting {M3}KC.  The graphical representation 
of this protocol in strand space is in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 the Simple Protocol 
 
Nodes n1 and m1 both share the same term M1.  However, n1 is a positive (sending) node 
and m1 is a negative (receiving) node.  The vertical path from n1 to n3 represents the 
strand of Dmitri.  The edge between n2 and n3 represents Dmitri deciphering Cyril’s 
encryption extracting the information and enciphering his own message to send off.  The 
actual act of sending the messages is captures along the edges between the n and m 
nodes. 
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